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Introduction
Section 62 of the Mental Health Act 1983 (‘the Act’) allows urgent treatment for mental disorder to be
given without patient consent, and overrides the requirement for the procedural safeguards provided for
within sections 57 and 58. “It is not applicable to any treatment that does not come within the remit of either
section 57 or section 58”5. This statutory ‘urgent treatment’ provision applies only to patients liable to be
detained under the long-term sections of the Act6. Under s62, treatment may be given:
(1) (a) which is immediately necessary to save the patient’s life; or
(b) which (not being irreversible7) is immediately necessary to alleviate 
serious suffering by the patient; or
(c) which (not being irreversible or hazardous8) is immediately 
necessary to alleviate serious suffering by the patient; or
(d) which (not being irreversible or hazardous) is immediately necessary and
represents the minimum interference necessary to prevent the patient from
behaving violently or being a danger to himself or to others.
Section 62 can also be applied where a responsible medical officer considers that discontinuance of the
treatment already in progress would cause serious suffering to the patient9. Such a situation might occur,
for example, when a patient withdraws their consent but it is deemed necessary for treatment to continue
until a second opinion can be obtained.
It can be seen that this section lifts the legal requirement to obtain a patient’s consent or the
authorisation of a SOAD for treatment with medication after the first three months, or for treatment with
66
Journal of Mental Health Law May 2008
1 Specialist Registrar in Forensic Psychiatry, East Midlands
Centre for Forensic Mental Health, Arnold Lodge,
Cordelia Close, Leicester.
2 Associate Specialist in Forensic Psychiatry, Rampton
Hospital, Retford, Nottinghamshire.
3 Specialist Registrar in Forensic Psychiatry, Rampton
Hospital, Retford, Nottinghamshire.
4 Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist, Rampton Hospital,
Retford, Nottinghamshire.
5 Jones R. (2006) Mental Health Act Manual (10th Ed.)
Sweet & Maxwell: London, page 332.
6 It does not apply to patients liable to be detained under ss.
4, 5(2), 5(4), 35, 37(4), 135, 136 or patients who have
been conditionally discharged and not recalled. See s. 56
MHA 1983..
7 Meaning, at s62(3), “if it has unfavourable irreversible
physical or psychological consequences”.
8 Meaning, at s62(3), “if it entails significant physical hazard”.
9 S62(2).
ECT at any time. It can also provide a legal basis, where immediately necessary, to provide the type of
treatments described in section 57 which otherwise require both consent and a second opinion (although
given the nature of treatments - in practice only psychosurgery - covered by section 57, the circumstances
in which such power would be invoked are “difficult to envisage”10).
The powers of urgent treatment provided under s.62 will be essentially retained following the
amendments made to the Act by the Mental Health Act 2007, although their application in the case of
ECT will be restricted to situations where treatment is immediately necessary to save life or, not being
irreversible, to prevent serious suffering (i.e. the criteria under s.62(1)(a) or (b)). By virtue of a new
s.62A, urgent treatment powers under s.62 will be applicable to patients recalled to hospital from
supervised community treatment (SCT), and to such patients whose SCT status is revoked. Emergency
treatment powers over SCT patients who have not been recalled to hospital will not apply where the
patient has given a capable refusal of consent.11 It appears that existing standards for best practice
(outlined below) will remain authoritative as they are all retained in the revised Code of Practice
published by the Department of Health in May 2008.
These standards are set out in the current Code of Practice12. They concern the proper application of the
section, patient consent and proper documentation. The Mental Health Act Commission has given
additional guidance regarding second opinions. No statutory forms are provided to document the use of
section 6213. Instead, the Code recommends that hospital managers devise their own forms14. Little audit
or research on the proper use of statutory urgent treatment has been reported in the literature. Johnson
& Curtice found in their general psychiatry service that section 62 was used exclusively to authorise
ECT15. In contrast, Haw & Shanmugarutnum found that in a large hospital including patients detained
under Part III of the Act in conditions of low and medium security, this section was used mostly to give
medication16. Neither of these audits was reported in detail and so compliance with all of the available
standards is not known. In Scotland, Nelson et al17 audited notification documentation relating to
treatment given under section 98 of the now repealed Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984 (which was
equivalent to section 58 of the Mental Health Act 1983). They found that regular medication was stated
in over 90% of cases, but ‘as required’ medication was less well recorded, suggesting perhaps that
psychiatrists are less good at documenting unplanned treatment. 
The aim of the audit which is the subject of this article, was to measure the use of statutory urgent
treatment at one of England’s three high security hospitals (Rampton Hospital) against the standards set
out in the Code and by the MHAC. Rampton Hospital is a large hospital which averaged around 400 beds
during the audit period and has a catchment area of approximately one third of England. The hospital
accommodates patients who suffer from a wide range of mental disorders, having directorates for mental
illness, learning disability, personality disorder, women and (from 2004) ‘Dangerous and Severe
Personality Disorder’. All patients are detained under the Mental Health Act 1983. It was submitted that
the proper use of statutory urgent treatment is important to Rampton Hospital as an institution which
accommodates patients presenting with the highest security needs owing to their risk to others.
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Method
The study audited all episodes of urgent treatment authorised by section 62 at Rampton Hospital over
nearly 5½ years between January 1st 2000 and June 1st 2005. A list of all episodes within the audit period
was generated by the Information Governance Department at Rampton Hospital. This was based on their
log of section 62 documentation sent to them as per hospital procedure. A data collection tool was
designed for the task. Data was collected from medical records and Mental Health Act Office files.
Records were retrieved from the Rampton Hospital Archive where necessary. Relevant information was
found on Section 62 forms, other MHA-related paperwork (forms 38 & 39), the continuous healthcare
record and medication cards. It was assumed that any second opinion given within ten days of statutory
urgent treatment had been requested as a result of that treatment episode.
Standards
Three audit standards were extracted from the Code of Practice (1999):
1. Section 62 should only be applied to those patients and types of treatments provided for in sections
57 and 58 of the Mental Health Act (1983).18
2. The patient’s consent should be sought for all proposed treatments which may lawfully be given under
the Act. The interview at which such consent was sought should be properly recorded in the medical
notes.19
3. Every time urgent treatment is given under section 62, the patient’s RMO or the doctor for the time
being in charge of the patient’s treatment should complete a form giving details of:
1) the proposed treatment;
2) why it is of urgent necessity to give the treatment;
3) the length of time for which the treatment was given.20
A further standard was provided by the Mental Health Act Commission:
4. Where section 62 is invoked, a request should generally simultaneously be made for a second opinion,
so that repeated use does not arise.21
It was expected that every urgent treatment episode would be compliant with standards 1–3. With regard
to standard 4, it was accepted that a need for a second opinion would not arise from every urgent
treatment episode, but reflecting the assertion that a request should generally be made it was expected
that this should happen in a majority of episodes.
Results
It was found that urgent treatment was given at Rampton Hospital under section 62, on 107 occasions
between January 2000 and June 2005. The results for each audit standard were as follows:
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Standard 1
The type of treatment authorised by section 62 was mostly medication:
No. Cases (%)
S57 treatments 0 (0.0)
S58 ECT 1 (0.9)
Medication 105 (98.1)
Missing data 1 (0.9)
Total 107
Tab. 1 Types of treatment given under section 62
Assessing adherence to this standard involved several considerations. The standard insists that section
62 should only be applied to those patients and types of treatments provided for in sections 57 and 58 of
the MHA 1983. All patients at this hospital are detained under long sections of the Act and thus
potentially liable to this section. However, 6% (6/107) of episodes involved patients for whom no
evidence could be found of having yet been treated with medication for mental disorder and so could
potentially have been given medication under the authority of section 6322 . In a further 7% of episodes
(7/107), data were missing. 
Whether or not the prescribed medication was treatment for a mental disorder, was considered. This
assessment was not straightforward as some medications for mental disorders are also indicated for other
disorders23. However, most of the medications that were used do not have common physical health
indications. It was concluded that in only one episode was medication for a physical disorder given under
s.62. Elsewhere, in only one case was section 62 used to authorise ECT.
In summary, we found evidence that standard one was met in 92% of episodes for which data was
available.
Standard 2
All types of medical record were scrutinised for evidence that the patient’s consent had been sought. The
findings were as follows24:
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Fig. 1 Was there evidence of an interview at which consent was discussed?
Of the cases for which data was available, there was evidence of an interview at which consent was
discussed in only 27% (24/88) of cases.
Standard 3
It was found in the large majority of cases that details of treatment, and a reason why it was of urgent
necessity, was recorded. In far fewer cases (little more than a third) the length of the treatment was given:
Present Absent Missing Data Total
Treatment 105 (98.1%) 1 (0.9%) 1 (0.9%) 107
Reason given 100 (93.5%) 4 (3.8%) 3 (2.8%) 107
Length of time given 38 (35.5%) 65 (60.7%) 4 (3.8%) 107
Tab. 2 Details given on section 62 treatment notification form
In nearly all cases for which data was available (99%), the form had been completed by a doctor. One
form had been completed by a member of nursing staff. Most commonly it was completed by the patient’s
responsible medical officer (53.3%). It was not possible to ascertain whether in the remaining cases, the
doctor was definitely the doctor for the time being in charge of the patient’s treatment, but in most cases
it appeared to be the on-call duty doctor, whom it was felt met that description.
Standard 4
It was found that a second opinion had been requested after a small majority (49/94 = 52.1%) of episodes
for which data was available. In a further 13 cases it was not possible to form a view as to whether or not
a second opinion had been requested, owing to missing data.
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Fig. 2. No. of episodes which were followed by a request for a second opinion 
Further Finding
The reasons given for the urgent necessity of treatment as per the statutory provisions were reviewed. As
might be expected, section 62 was most commonly invoked to prevent the patient behaving violently or
being a danger to himself or others:
Fig. 3 Reason given for urgent necessity of treatment (more than one reason may be given)
In only a handful of episodes, did RMOs exercise their power to use section 62(2) so as to continue with
a treatment plan pending compliance with section 57 or section 58.
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We conclude that the provisions for statutory urgent treatment for mental disorder were generally being
applied at Rampton Hospital to give appropriate treatments25 to appropriate patients and the basic details
of treatment were being documented. Therefore, it is our view that standards 1 and 3 were largely
satisfied. We found that doctors did not routinely demonstrate that consent had been sought, and so
practice in this regard fell well short of standard 2. We also note that those detailing urgent treatment did
not outline the length of time for which treatment was to be given. We speculate that this may be because
this standard as derived from the Code does not accord well with clinical practice inasmuch as it is
phrased in the past tense as if to capture the entire treatment episode, when in fact this form is usually
completed at the beginning of an episode of urgent treatment. Finally, we found that around half of
episodes stimulated a second opinion request, suggesting that standard 4 was close to being met.
Overall, we observe that episode details which were prompted for specifically by the existing notification
documentation were well recorded and details which were not prompted for specifically were not well
recorded, either on the notification form or elsewhere in the clinical records. For example, the reason for
urgent treatment was requested on the documentation form, but confirmation that consent had been
sought was not. Similarly, a prompt for the type of treatment given was included on the form, but did not
go so far as to ask for the length of treatment. This correlation between well-recorded data and the
content of the data collection form is not surprising, but in our view does emphasise the importance of
well-structured and fail-safe data collection systems.
Audit Cycle – The Next Step
In keeping with the belief that audit should be an ongoing process or cycle enabling continual
improvement, we implemented interventions to improve the quality of section 62 usage. Most
importantly, we redesigned the notification documentation so it included specific prompts for every piece
of information required to meet the audit standards. For example, to make the recording of consent more
user-friendly, we introduced a list of tick box options to document that an attempt had been made to
obtain consent and the reason why this had not been successful. In addition, we presented our findings
locally at a meeting of Rampton Hospital doctors and at a national meeting of forensic psychiatrists. The
new notification documentation has now been in use for over a year and later in 2008 we will repeat the
audit to measure its effectiveness.
Discussion
We believe this project was ambitious in scale, auditing as it did the use of section 62 within the entire
patient population of a high security hospital for more than five years. There is little in the literature with
which our results can be directly compared. Of interest, our finding that section 62 was being used almost
entirely to administer medication accorded with that of Haw & Shanmugarutnum26, and not with Johnson
& Curtice27 who in contrast found it was only used to authorise ECT. An explanation for this might be
that the former audited a population which contained forensic patients and so was more akin to our own.
Their sample is likely to have exhibited higher rates of severe and enduring mental disorder and lower
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rates of depression and acute suicidality than would be found in a general psychiatric setting.
Our main findings demonstrated that psychiatrists showed mixed ability at complying both with
secondary legislation and guidance from the Mental Health Act Commission. However, when supported
by structured information governance systems, their performance was, in our view, good. We hope that
we have helped to improve compliance by introducing better notification documentation. However this
finding does, perhaps, suggest there ought to be a statutory data collection vehicle for section 62
treatment as there is for other sections of the Mental Health Act, and that this should not be left to local
hospital managers to design. Probably the worst recorded was information as to whether consent had been
sought. As practising psychiatrists, we can see that where urgent treatment is being considered, the
clinical situation is likely to be one where seeking consent is particularly difficult. One response to
criticism on this issue may be that the patient’s mental state was so disturbed that any serious attempt
would have been futile and may even have delayed treatment without any realistic prospect of benefit.
Nevertheless, we feel that it is important to document this as the reason why consent had not been
obtained, and our new documentation provides for this. 
There were several limitations to this audit. Firstly, we were reliant on a list generated from records
returned to a central office for detection of statutory urgent treatment. This may have introduced a
sampling bias as there may have been something different about urgent treatment episodes which were
not reported in this way (although all should have been reported). For example, episodes not reported to
the central office may have been less well documented. From our consultations with stakeholders at both
ends of this process (both ward staff and information governance staff) we feel reasonably reassured that
the practice of notification was well-established and understood. We feel we have to accept this limitation
owing to the practical difficulties of collecting the data for an audit on such a scale in this setting, but we
are mindful that the results obtained may be unrepresentative to some degree.
Secondly, there were problems inherent in collecting data respectively from such a long sample period.
Some data was missing (the exact percentage varied according to each piece of information as they were
available from different sources such as multidisciplinary record, drug card etc). Most of the missing data
was accounted for by entire records being missing. It appeared that this usually occurred when the patient
had been transferred to another high security hospital. This was less often the case when the patient had
been transferred to a less secure hospital or discharged to prison or elsewhere. Therefore, it is possible that
the missing data represented patients who were more mentally disturbed and were in need of a high
security hospital environment in the longer term. Other problems with collecting data highlighted deficits
in recording the requisite information on existing documentation. For example, there was no space or
prompt provided to comment on consent. This meant that we had to review all contemporaneous
available clinical information to see if it had been recorded elsewhere. This made data collection less
robust and increased the possibility of not finding information.
Thirdly, the difficulty in ascertaining when records were missing may have led to us overestimating the
number of patients who had not previously received medication for mental disorder, and thus could have
been treated without their consent under the three month rule without resorting to section 62. For
example, in reviewing the extensive records we may have concluded there was no evidence that they had
received medication before, but there may have been missing documentation of which we were unaware
which showed that they had. If there were indeed such cases we will have underestimated the number of
episodes in which this standard was met. However, as compliance with this standard was already good at
over 90% we do not believe any error would significantly alter our conclusions.
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Fourthly, with respect to standard four, we inferred that a request for a second opinion had been made if
one was given within ten days. We had no means of assessing directly whether a request had in fact been
made to the Mental Health Act Commission. We hope that any request would have been met within ten
days, but it is possible that some opinions took longer to arrange. Conversely, it is possible that a visit from
a second opinion doctor had already been arranged before section 62 treatment took place, and so had
not been precipitated by use of the section. 
We acknowledge these limitations, but despite these shortcomings we believe that valid observations can
be made and drawn upon to improve adherence to legislation. Furthermore, we are confident we have
taken important practical steps to enhance our own practice. The available evidence suggests that the
audit standards we adopted will continue to form the basis of guidance on statutory urgent treatment after
the amendments to the Act by the Mental Health Act 2007 come into force. Therefore, we believe that
the audit cycle started here will be relevant for the foreseeable future. We look forward to repeating this
audit and assessing the impact of our interventions. Our next audit should be amended slightly to
acknowledge the amendments made to s. 62 in respect of ECT. Similar audits completed in settings
receiving patients recalled from the community under community treatment orders should include this
type of patient within their sample.
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